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“There is much more to electronic warfare than simply detecting enemy transmissions.” 
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Nowadays with the development and cost reduction of unmanned vehicles, 
armed forces around the world have been using these systems as a replacement or 
complement for conventional manned systems. Because of all the advantages inherent 
to the use of these vehicles, there have been many possible applications for these 
systems. One of possible applications is its use as a vehicle for carrying an Electronic 
Warfare package. Electronic Warfare, since the military started using and depending on 
the electromagnetic spectrum to achieve their objectives, has been a major warfare area 
of high interest. 
In my thesis, I suggest the creation of an Electronic Warfare package with 
jamming and spoofing capacities for communication systems, designed to be 
implemented on an unmanned vehicle, with remote control dedicated programs. To do 
this, I took advantage of the Software Defined Radio technology along with the GNU 
Radio software, installed on a Raspberry Pi computer in order to be transportable even 
by small vehicles. 
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Atualmente, com o desenvolvimento e a redução de custos dos veículos não 
tripulados, as forças armadas em todo o mundo têm utilizado estes sistemas como 
substituto ou complemento aos sistemas tripulados. Devido às vantagens inerentes à 
sua utilização, têm havido inúmeras aplicações para estes sistemas. Uma das possíveis 
aplicações é a sua utilização como veículo para transporte de um pacote de Guerra 
Eletrónica. A Guerra Eletrónica, desde que os militares começaram a utilizar e a 
depender do espetro eletromagnético para alcançar os seus objetivos, tem sido uma das 
principais áreas da guerra de elevado interesse.  
Nesta dissertação, sugiro a criação de um módulo de Guerra Eletrónica com a 
capacidade de efetuar empastelamento e mistificação de a sistemas de comunicações, 
idealizado para ser implementado num veículo não tripulado, com programas dedicados 
para controlo remoto. Para isto, recorri à tecnologia do Radio Definido por Software 
assim como ao software GNU Radio, instalado num computador Raspberry Pi por forma 
a poder ser transportado também por pequenos veículos. 
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In this chapter, there will be presented the motivation, research question and 
hypothesis and the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Motivation 
Nowadays unmanned systems (UxS) and systems are an accessible tool for almost 
everyone. The technological advances allow us to buy UxS for relatively low prices. This 
is having an impact on how military and civilian operations are being carried out [1], 
causing UxS to operate on more complex missions where higher levels of situational 
responsiveness and autonomous decision making are necessary [2]. In today’s 
battlefields, UxS are highly integrated on the environment, bringing new intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and tactical support capabilities to military forces 
[3], trading the risk of losing human life by systems. With this, the military around the 
world are exploiting the UxS potential in the various warfare areas, including Electronic 
Warfare (EW).  
Electronic Warfare is major warfare area comprehending any action on the 
electromagnetic (EM) environment. Because military forces are becoming highly 
dependent on EM spectrum operations, they recognize its vulnerabilities and the 
importance on controlling this warfare environment [4]. On the last decade, there were 
many examples of how military forces are vulnerable to EW actions. On the 12th of April 
2014, the Russian military claimed that they disabled the Aegis Combat system of the 
US Navy destroyer USS Donald Cook with an EW payload [5]. Also, during the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise “Trident Juncture 2018”, the Swedish 
claimed that the Russian military tried to jam the Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
that this wasn’t the first time they did so [6]. 
Because EW is an area of great interest to the military around the world, including 
the Portuguese Navy, this thematic proved to me a big motivation to develop additional 




1.2 Research Question 
As stated before, in the last years UxS became a reality on modern battlefield 
scenarios, changing the way military operations are carried out. Along with this, EW 
represents an area of great importance to military forces. Combining these two subjects 
in one allows the formulation of the following research question: 
“Is it possible to implement an EW package on an UxS using low-cost technologies with 
the purpose of improving the EW capacities for the Portuguese Navy?” 
To answer this question, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
“By using an SDR transceiver and a Raspberry Pi computer, it is possible to build a 
device with jamming and spoofing capabilities on various communication systems, 
capable of being implemented on an UxS.” 
1.3 Research Method  
The research method is done according to [7] and [1]. First, a research question is 
formulated in order to set a goal and purpose for the thesis. Next, a research background 
is made were a research about the subject and related work is made. This is followed by 
the hypothesis formulation where is proposed a solution for the research question. The 
next step is the design experiment where the proposed solution in executed. Next, is 
the hypothesis test in which the designed experiment is tested. After, is the 
interpretation and analysis of the results and finally, the publishing of the results in order 
to share the developed work with the scientific community. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided in five chapters. In the first chapter, the motivation that led 
to the development of this work, the chosen research method and the explanation on 
the thesis’ structure are presented. 
The second chapter is where the research of the background is done. There is an 
explanation on EW basics, existing jamming techniques and types, and the systems that 




In the third chapter it is presented all the necessary hardware interface a software 
programming necessary to create Electronic Attacks to the systems described on the 
second chapter. 
The fourth chapter is where the tests and results made in order to prove and 
validate the capacities of the EW package, are presented. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter, conclusions are made in accordance to the suggested 











In this chapter, an introduction to EW is made, as well as an explanation of its 
divisions. Also, several Jamming techniques and jammer types are presented along with 
the identification of the bands, systems and application on naval operations where the 
EW package might apply, including a brief analysis of the importance and applicability 
of EW in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Information Warfare (IW) are the warfare-like actions against any information 
system or the measures to protect our own systems. The IW applied military setting is 
Command and Control (C2) warfare which is composed by: physical destruction of 
information systems, psychological operations, deception, operational security and EW 
[8]. The latter is the focus of my thesis. 
EW is defined as the military action involving the use of the EM spectrum and 
directed energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the enemy [9]. In this definition, 
no reference is made to the equipment used but to the objective and purpose of the 
mission and because of this, EW is a vast concept that covers several operations. 
EW can be divided by the type of operation in three categories: Electronic Attack 
(EA), Electronic Protection (EP) and Electronic Warfare Support (ES) [10]. 
According to [9] and [10]: 
Electronic Attack is the division of EW involving the use of electromagnetic or 
directed energy to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of 
neutralizing or destroying the enemy’s combat capability. It can be sub-divided in 
jamming, deception, anti-radiation missiles and directed energy weapons. 
Jamming is the most common sub-division of EA. Jamming is the emission of EM 
energy with the objective of interfering with the enemy’s use of the EM spectrum. 
Jamming can be divided in two divisions according to the type of signal: Radar Jamming 
and Communications Jamming. In EW applied to communications, the purpose of 
jamming is to break the enemy’s communications link, denying them access to the 




information [11]. Jammers can have different configurations. For example, there are 
standoff jammers which are the ones that operate in the friendly held battlespace, 
stand-in jammers that operate in the hostile held battlespace, the narrowband jammers 
that only attack the carrier frequency and the barrage jammers that emit a broad range 
of frequencies simultaneously [8].  
Electronic Protection is the division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to 
protect personnel, facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy 
employment of EW that degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability. This 
includes the employment of techniques in order to minimize the effects of enemy’s or 
friendly’s EA and ES actions [12]. The following table lists some of the available EP 
techniques used by modern anti-ship missiles: 
Table 1 - EP Actions in Modern Anti-Ship Missiles 
Missile Country of Origin EP Action 
Harpoon Block 1C United States of America Frequency Agility 
Harpoon Block 2 Unites States of America Doppler Processing 
Exocet MM40 Block 2 France 
Frequency Agility / 
Leading Edge Track / 
Home-on-Jam 
Exocet MM40 Block 3 France Doppler Processing 
RBS 15M/F/K Sweden 
Frequency Agility / 
Jittered PRF / Home-on-
Jam 
RBS 15 Mk3 Sweden FM-CW 
SS-N-22 Russia Supersonic / Passive ARM 
SS-N-25 Russia 
Passive ARM / Coherent 
Processing 
SS-N-27 Russia Zigzag Flight Path 






Electronic Warfare Support is the division of electronic warfare involving actions 
tasked by, or under direct control of, an operation commander to search for, intercept, 
identify and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy. Even 
though ES and signal intelligence (SIGINT) [which is includes communications 
intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT)] both include receiving enemy 
transmissions, they are differentiated in the purpose for which the transmissions are 
received. In COMINT and ELINT the received enemy signals (communication and 
noncommunication) are used to gather intelligence from the carried information in the 
signals and to determine details of the enemy’s EM systems. On the other hand, ES is 
the collection of enemy signals (communication and noncommunication) with the 
purpose of taking and action against the signal or the associated weapon with these 
signals [13]. 
In the following figure, the three divisions of EW are presented along with the types 
of operations applicable to each one: 
 
Figure 1 - Overview of EW [4] 
These divisions evolved from the former definitions that were Electronic 
countermeasures (ECM), Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) and Electronic 




2.1 Electronic Warfare in NATO 
EW in the NATO is defined as “The military action that exploits EM energy to 
provide situational awareness and achieve offensive and defensive effects. EW, the 
conduct of EM Operations (Figure 2), is warfare in the Electromagnetic Environment 
(EME)” [14].  
 
Figure 2 - EM Operations Concept [10] 
NATO also acknowledges that the dependency of electronics in the modern 
battlefields and the threat posed to NATO by the increased EW potential of its 
adversaries, increase its need of controlling the EM environment by having an effective 
EW doctrine defined by NATO as “the best way to accomplish Joint EW operations”. 
Specifically, EW has a crucial role in the C2 Warfare and Information Operations, being 
considered a central discipline of both. Another importance of EW is that the Rules of 
Engagement my often permit EW when other activities are inappropriate. 
The uses of EW in NATO include the control of the EM spectrum to ensure 
provision, protection, exploitation and attack of C2 and other battlespace electronic 
systems; area, force or platform protection; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition 
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and offensive and defensive operations.  
There are three possible EW actions: EA, Electronic Defence and Electronic 





Figure 3 - EM Actions and Effects [14] 
Electronic Jamming is a considered a type of operation of Electronic Counter Measures 
(ECM). In NATO operations, Electronic Support Measures, Electronic Counter Measures 
and Electronic Protective Measures are to be used as EW divisions instead of EA, EP and 
ES definitions used by some authors and some countries like the United States. 
Electronic Jamming is defined by NATO [14] as “the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or 
reflection of EM energy, with the objective of impairing the effectiveness of electronic 
devices, equipment or systems being used by an adversary. Co-ordination of jamming 
operations is a J3 (Current Operations) responsibility in consultation with J2 
(Operational Intelligence), J6 (Communications and Information Systems) and the 
Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (EWCC).  Co-ordination and planning are 
conducted at the highest level of command, but control should be vested in the 
appropriate operational commander.” 
Another important type of operation of ECM is Electronic Deception (ED). 
Electronic Deception, according to NATO [14], is “the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, 
alteration, absorption or reflection of EM energy in a manner intended to confuse, 




with military deception, principally against communications systems. Therefore, ED 
should be considered during the development of any deception plan. The J2 staffs 
provide information on the adversary’s use of the EM spectrum, vulnerability, 
surveillance capabilities, and their likely reaction to deception, while the EW staffs 
provides the intelligence staff with reports indicating their actual reaction to 
implemented ED operations. 
ED is considered effective when the adversary relies heavily on EM emissions 
(which may cause the adversary to react in a manned prejudicial to his interests by 
manipulating, distorting or faking its transmissions), when the adversary is dependent 
on the intercept of our EM emissions for his own intelligence collection or at a critical 
time in the adversary’s operations. 
On Figure 4 is shown the relationship between the different areas in EW and in 
the EM environment: 
 
Figure 4 - Relationship between the several areas of EW [14] 
For NATO, the applicability of EW in Naval operations is vast. Naval forces, acting 




when applying the principles of EW in amphibious operations, anti-surface warfare 
(ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) being included anti-
ship missile defence (ASMD) in the latter. Naval EW resources are used to deny, deceive 
destroy or exploit the adversary’s use of the EM spectrum and to protect the use of the 





2.2 Jamming Techniques 
There are several techniques and strategies to make jamming. These techniques 
vary according to the type of system that we are trying to jam, how much power does it 
use, the modulation, among others. Also, the duration of the jamming in relation to the 
total length of the signal is important. For example, in voice communications, it has been 
demonstrated that jamming about 30% of the transmission is enough to degrade the 
message to a point where it makes it understandable [15].  
In modern communications, there are also several methods of transmitting a 
signal making it harder to jam. These methods include frequency-hopping, direct 
sequence or spread spectrum where the signal is spread by the EM spectrum, resulting 
in a large bandwidth and hard to jam and detect signal. 
Another consideration is the possibility of transmitting a signal where the jamming 
signal is superior to the received signal. As explained by [16] it is possible to 
communicate over a channel disturbed by Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) and 
even hide a signal within the noise by using more dimensions than the ones necessary 
for the transmission. 
2.3 Jammer Types 
In order to jam a signal, there are several types of jammers that can be used. Each 
one of them has their advantages and disadvantages and the characteristics of the 
intercepted signal should be taken into consideration before choosing the type of 
jammer. According to different authors, there are various ways to classify jammer types. 





Figure 5 - Five jammer spectral densities types [17] 
 
The first one (a), the barrage jammer, which he considers the least efficient 
jammer, transmits a band-limited Gaussian noise. This jammer is used to cover a large 
section of the signal spectrum, simulating the creation of an additional source of AWGN, 
in order to deny the counteraction of frequency hopping to a jammer-free zone.  
However, when these jammers and the signal generators are limited on the 
power resource of the transmitter, they become vulnerable to spread spectrum 
techniques, which are the most efficient EP measure against barrage jammers. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 6 where a rectangular signal (left) and a spread spectrum signal 
(right) are jammed and, after passing through a matched filter, the spread spectrum 






Figure 6 - Comparison between a rectangular and a spread spectrum signal in the presence of a barrage 
jammer [18] 
 
The second one (b), the partial band jammer, is a jammer that only transmits 
bandlimited AWGN, covering only a part of the signal’s bandwidth. The advantage of 
these over the barrage jammers is that it can channel more power over one or more 
desired sections of the signal’s bandwidth, especially if dealing with frequency hopping 
spread spectrum signals [19].  
Tone jamming, the third (c) and fourth (d) on Figure 2, happens when one or 
more tones are introduced in the signal’s spectrum. Their jamming efficiency depends 
on the number of tones and on their location (considering the same Power Spectral 
Density (PSD) of the previous). Typically, on an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), a tactical 
jammer is limited to about 100 watts, making the number of tones to be limited to 
around 10 [15]. As stated before, tone jamming may be divided into single tone jamming 
and multitone jamming. Single tone jamming also known as a spot jamming, according 
to [20], is the jamming of a specific or frequency. It’s basically a Continuous Wave (CW) 




Direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) signals, especially if close to the receiver, the 
jamming signal causes problems in the gain control systems of the received signal [15].  
Multitone jammers are jammers that emit more than one tone, capable of 
covering a larger bandwidth than a single tone jammer or jamming several channels on 
a multiple channel receiver [21]. 
The matched spectral jammer detects the signal’s spectral density and uses a 
Gaussian random process to create a “matched spectral” jamming signal identical to the 
original signal [17]. 
Another way of dividing jammers by type is suggested in [22], for jammers in 































Table 2 - Proactive Jammers 
 
 
Table 3 - Reactive Jammers 
 
Table 4 - Function-specific Jammers 
Proactive Jammers 
Jammer that transmits whether there is or there is not data communication.  
Constant Jammer Emits random bits continuously 
Deceptive Jammer Emits regular packets continuously 
Random Jammer Emits bits and/or packets intermittently 
Reactive Jammer  
Jammer that only transmits if data communication is detected 
RTS/CTS 
Jammer 
Jams when requests-to-send (RTS) signal is emitted. This prevents de 




Corrupts the data or acknowledgment packets 
Function-specific Jammer 




Hops over all available channels, jamming each channel for a 




Hops between different channels, with the possibility of jamming 
several channels at the same time 
Pulsed-noise 
Jammer 
It can switch channels and jam different bandwidths. Like the 





Table 5 - Smart-hybrid Jammers 
2.4 Identification of the bands, systems and applicability on Naval 
Operations 
In this sub-chapter, there are going to be presented the different bands and 
systems where the jammer works.  
2.4.1 AIS  
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a Very High Frequency (VHF) 
transponder system with an automatic identification capacity, developed by the 
International Maritime Organization, in the sequence of the revision of Chapter V of the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention [23]. It was designed as a navigation safety aid 
and as an environmental protection aid, through the exchange of information between 
ships and coast stations [24].  
Because this system is mandatory for every ship with 300 or more gross tonnage 
and all passenger vessels and highly recommended for all ships, almost every vessel uses 
this system [25]. Also, according to the MarineTraffic website [26], AIS information is 
used to serve several purposes such as tug operations, communication between vessel 
crews and their family’s members, coast guard and border patrol operations, 
environmental protection agencies, among others.  
Smart-hybrid Jammer  
 Jammer with the capacity of conserving energy by emitting only the necessary 
power to disrupt the channel (smart). It can be either proactive or reactive (hybrid) 
Control Channel 
Jammer 
Multi-channel jammer that targets the control channel used to 
coordinate the network activity 
Implicit Jammer 
Jammer that disables the functionality of the target and causes 
denial-of-service, by targeting the nodes of the access point 
Flow-jamming 
Jammer 




The AIS transmits a great variety of information about the ship such as: GPS data 
(position, course and speed), data from the gyrocompass, International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) number, call sign, length and beam, location of the antenna, ship 
type and draft, hazardous cargo, destination, Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) and route 
plan. Its data that can be programmed into the unit because it never changes is known 
as static data like the IMO number, the data introduced by the user is known as voyage 
related data, like the route plan and the data that’s being constantly updated 
(automatically) is known as dynamic data, like the ships’ position. 
The AIS works on VHF channel 87B and 88B at 161.975 MHz and 162.025 MHz 
respectively with a transmission bit rate of 9600 baud. It uses Self Organizing Time-
Division Multiple Access in order to avoid collisions between the transmissions of the 
different stations, using the GPS time as a common time reference. AIS messages are 
standardized hence, it’s relatively easy to create messages or to change their content 
directly on the raw code [27]. This makes them rather vulnerable to jamming and 
spoofing, and thereby, a good and easy target to perform electronic attacks. There are 
tactical situations where it could be useful to create “ghost contacts” in order to baffle 
the enemy’s perception of the surrounding environment. On the other hand, it might 
also be useful to deny them all AIS information by jamming the system. 
2.4.2 ISM Band 
The Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band are parts of the EM spectrum 
allocated for Radio Frequency (RF) use of industrial, scientific and medical equipment. 
According to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) [28], ISM band 
application is the “Operation of equipment or appliances designed to generate and use 
locally radio frequency energy for industrial, scientific, medical, domestic or similar 
purposes, excluding applications in the field of telecommunications.” In the definition 
by ITU, telecommunication applications are not considered because of the RF 
interference that ISM equipment may cause but, since this band is open and unlicensed, 
there are also many short-range telecommunications devices using this band. 
According to the European Communications Committee [29], the ISM band 




Table 6 - ISM Band Frequencies 
ISM BAND FREQUENCIES 
Start Frequency End Frequency 
11.3 kHz 14 kHz 
6765 kHz 6795 kHz 
13553 kHz 13567 kHz 
26.957 MHz 27.283 MHz 
40.66 MHz 40.7 MHz 
430.05 MHz 434.79 MHz 
2400 MHz 2500 MHz 
5725 MHz 5875 MHz 
24 GHz 24.25 GHz 
61 GHz 61.5 GHz 
 
Many systems that we use on a daily basis work on the ISM band. Some examples of 
these systems are the IEEE 802.11/Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or car remote controls [30]. 
2.4.3 GNSS 
The satellite navigation is a very important component of modern navigation 
systems, specially the systems contained in the Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GNSS). Among the existing GNSSs, three were explored: the GPS, the Globalnaya 
navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) and the Galileo [31]. 
 GPS 
The GPS is, according to the United States (US) Government [32], a U.S.-owned 
utility that provides users with positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. The 
system uses satellites in order to provide the PNT information. The GPS has many 
applications worldwide from navigation to clock sensitive systems, which makes it 
essential for some systems to work properly.  
The GPS satellites emit two signals: a civilian which apart of some restrictions, its 




of Defence. The GPS civilian signal works in two frequencies: the L1 and the L2C. The L1 
and the L2C are modulated with a carrier wave that works in the frequency 1575.2 MHz 
and 1227.6 MHz and, just like the AIS signal, its packet information is public, making it 
vulnerable to electronic attacks [33]. The tactical and strategical advantages of 
controlling the GPS signal are significant. For example, by denying the enemy the 
capacity of receiving a GPS signal, several systems are affected, reducing their combat 
and defence capacity.  
 GLONASS 
The GLONASS is a Russian satellite navigation system like the GPS. It was 
developed by the Russian Federal Space Agency and also has both a military and a 
civilian signal. The civilian signals’ frequency is 1602+n*0.5625 MHz and 1246+n*0.4375 
MHz, being n the channel number [34]. 
 GALILEO 
Just like the US and Russia had the necessity of having an independent satellite 
navigation system, the European Union also developed its own. Galileo, named after 
Galileo Galilei, is the European satellite navigation system developed by the European 






3 Software, Hardware and Interface Development 
In this chapter, there are presented all the necessary software development and 
the hardware solutions founded for the creation of the EW package. 
3.1 Definition of the Hardware  
In this sub-chapter, there will be presented the architecture for the EW package.  
3.1.1 SDR 
According to different organizations, there are many definitions for Software 
Defined Radio (SDR) [36]. For example, the ITU defines it as “A radio in which the RF 
operating parameters of frequency range, modulation type, and/or output power can 
be set or altered by software, or the technique by which this is achieved”[37] and the 
U.S. Federal Communications Commission defines it as “A radio that includes a 
transmitter in which the operating parameters of frequency range, modulation type or 
maximum output power (either radiated or conducted), or the circumstances under 
which the transmitter operates in accordance with Commission rules, can be altered by 
making a change in software without making any changes to hardware components that 
affect the radio frequency emissions”[38]. Although there are different definitions for 
SDR, they all state that SDR is a radio platform where we can alter several parameters 
in software without changing the hardware.  
Basically, an SDR is a radio and software technique used in radio 
communications, where most or all of the signal processing, such as modulation, 
sampling and waveform synthesis, is done using software routines in general purpose 
processors (GPP) rather than application-specific hardware (like in hardware-based 
radios). Digital signal processing (DSP) made in software has several advantages over 
DSP made in hardware, including higher flexibility and adaptability (routines can be 
changed during execution) and a reduction of cost inherent to the hardware since 
general purpose hardware is used. Other two important advantages of using SDRs is the 
existence of a big online community, offering lots of support (specially for the open 




knowledge of signal processing, and the available open source DSP frameworks tailored 
for SDR applications.  
3.1.2 HackRF One 
The HackRF one is an open-source SDR half-duplex transceiver designed by 
Michael Ossmann [39], with operating frequencies from 1 MHz to 6 GHz. It’s able to 
process 20 million samples per second (being its maximum bandwidth 20 MHz), it 
connects to a computer through USB and it’s compatible with GNU Radio [40]. Its 
maximum transmission power is [39]: 
• 10 MHz to 2150 MHz: 5 dBm to 15 dBm, generally increasing as frequency 
decreases 
• 2150 MHz to 2750 MHz: 13 dBm to 15 dBm 
• 2750 MHz to 4000 MHz: 0 dBm to 5 dBm, increasing as frequency 
decreases 
• 4000 MHz to 6000 MHz: -10 dBm to 0 dBm, generally increasing as 
frequency decreases 
 The HackRF One was chosen once it was the one with a better relationship 
between price, operating frequencies, bandwidth and samples rate when compared to 
its peers. A brief comparison between the most common RX/TX SDRs is made on Table 
7: 
Table 7 - Comparison between SDRs 




HackRF One 1 MHz to 6 GHz 20 MHz 150€ 20 MHz 
LimeSDR 100 KHz to 3.8 GHz 61.44 MHz 250€ 61.44 MHz 
USRP B200 70 MHz to 6 GHz 56 MHz 600€ 56 MHz 
ADALM-
PLUTO 





3.1.3 GNU Radio 
According to the definition on [41], “GNU Radio is a free & open-source software 
development toolkit that provides signal processing blocks to implement software 
radios. It can be used with readily available low-cost external RF hardware to create 
software-defined radios, or without hardware in a simulation-like environment. It is 
widely used in research, industry, academia, government, and hobbyist environments 
to support both wireless communications research and real-world radio systems.” 
GNU Radio provides a useful tool called GNU Radio Companion. The Companion 
is a tool that allows the user to build flow graphs through a series of pre-made blocks, 
providing a way to create its programs in an intuitive way, with a graphical interface, for 
rapid prototyping. Because the Companion’s blocks generate a python script, it’s 
possible to program the blocks with python code lines, allowing the blocks to have a 
greater interaction between them, making it a powerful signal processing tool. 
3.1.4 Raspberry Pi 
To run the previous programs, the HackRF must be connected to a computer 
containing the programs and the necessary dependencies. In order to implement them 
on an autonomous vehicle, especially on an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the 
computer must be small and light without losing the processing capacity to run the 
programs.  
To accomplish this, the found solution was to use a Raspberry Pi. The Raspberry Pi 
is a low-cost single-board computer built by the Raspberry Pi Foundation [42] which, 
according to the latter, is intended for code learning and to build electronics projects. 
The used model is the Raspberry Pi 3B+ with a 1 GB RAM, 4 USB ports and 1.4 GHz 64-
bit CPU. Its storage is guaranteed by a 32 GB SD card with the Raspbian Operating 
System installed [43].  
The Raspberry was chosen because it was the one with a better relationship 
between price, CPU, RAM and size of the online community, when compared to its 
peers. A brief comparison between the most common single board computers is made 








CPU RAM Online Community 
Raspberry Pi 3B+ 35€ ARM Cortex-A53 1 GB Big 
Banana Pi 35€ ARM Cortex-A7 1 GB Medium 
ODROID-XU4 70€ ARM Cortex-A15 2GB Medium 
3.2 Software Development 
To create the jamming and spoofing capacities that compose the EW package, 
GNU Radio programs were developed. All programs were divided in two parts: a client 
and a server. The server is the part that runs on the autonomous vehicle and the client 
is the part that is on the Ground Control Station (GCS). 
3.2.1 AIS Jammer: 
The AIS Jammer is a program composed by a set of blocks with the capacity of 
jamming an AIS signal reducing the situational awareness for the jammed unit. The 
blocks provide the user the options of choosing the bandwidth of the jamming signal 
adapted to the AIS and the IF and RF gains. The AIS Jammer was built in GNU Radio with 






Figure 8 - AIS Jammer Client Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• QT GUI Range ID: “width” – This block is a slider which gives the user the option 
of controlling the width of the jamming signal by changing the cut-off frequency 
of the low pass filter. It has a minimum value of 1 kHz, a maximum value of 25 
kHz and a default value of 20 kHz. 
• QT GUI Range ID: “if_gain” and “rf_gain” – These blocks are sliders that are used 
to control the intermediate frequency (IF) gain and the RF gain. The IF gain slider 
has a minimum of 0 dB, a maximum of 47 dB (HackRF limit) and a default of 10dB 
and the RF slider has a minimum of 0 dB, a maximum of 14 dB (HackRF limit) and 
a default of 5 dB. 
• XMLRPC Client – Block that makes the connection between the Server and Client 
using the XML-RPC protocol. Each variable has a dedicated XMLRPC block which 
has as input the Internet Protocol (IP) address and port of the machine where 






Figure 9 - AIS Jammer Server Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• Variable ID: “samp_rate” – Variable containing the sample rate used by the other 
blocks. It has a value of 100 kHz which is enough to cover both AIS Channels. 
• Variable ID: “if_gain” – Variable that receives the desired value to the IF gain. 
• Variable ID: “rf_gain” – Variable that receives the desired value to the RF gain. 
• Variable ID: “width” – Variable that receives the desired value to the bandwidth 
of the jamming signal. 
• XMLRPC Server - Block that makes the connection between the Server and Client 
using the XML-RPC protocol. The XMLRPC block is programmed with the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address and port of the Server. 
• Noise Source – Gaussian noise source which will produce the jamming signal. 
• Low Pass Filter – Low pass filter with a cut-off frequency equal to “width/2” and 
a transition width of 3 kHz. This block is used to filter the noise to a bandwidth 
equal to the bandwidth of each AIS channel. The graph of the low pass filter is 
shown on Figure 10: 
• Signal Source – Two cosine signal sources, with a frequency of -25 kHz and 25 
kHz. These frequencies are used because the two AIS channels are located at 162 




filter, they produce two waves with a bandwidth equal to “width/2” centred at 
± 25 kHz. The equation that represents the generated signal is the following, with 
A being the amplitude and f the difference between the channel frequencies and 
162MHz: 
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐴 cos(2𝜋 ± 𝑓)                                                (1) 
• Add – Block used to add the ± 25 kHz signals. 
• Osmocom Sink – Block that sends the information to the HackRF and shifts the 
signals to the desired frequency. In this case, it’s set to 162 MHz, the AIS 
frequency. It also deals with the IF and RF gains provided by the sliders. 
Figure 10 shows the information sent by the “Add” block to the HackRF with the 
“width” variable with the value 10. 
 
Figure 10 - Information sent to the HackRF by the “Add” Block 
3.2.2 Free Jammer 
The Free Jammer is a program with the objective of generating a jamming signal 
in an arbitrary frequency. The user can choose the centre frequency of the jammer, 
between 30 MHz and 6 GHz (operating frequencies of the HackRF), the bandwidth of 
the jamming signal and control the IF and RF gains. The Free Jammer was built in GNU 






Figure 11 - Free Jammer Client Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• Variable ID: “samp_rate” – Used for tests. 
• QT GUI Entry ID: “freq” – Block that generates a text box for the user to introduce 
the desired centre frequency. 
• QT GUI Range ID: “bw” – Slider to control the bandwidth of the emitted signal. It 
has a minimum of 1 Hz, a maximum of 2 MHz (might be altered according to the 
purpose of the jammer) and a default of 100 kHz. 







Figure 12 - Free Jammer Server Block Diagram 
• Variables – Variables that receive the values from the client through the XMLRPC 
blocks. 
• Multiply – Block used to multiply the signal from the “Signal Source” and the 
“Low Pass Filter”. 
• Low Pass Filter – Same function as in 3.2.1.2 with a cut-off frequency of 
“bandwidth/2”. 
• XMLRPC Server; Noise Source; Signal Source – Same function as in 3.2.1.2 
• Osmocom sink – Same function as in 3.2.1.2 with a variable centre frequency 
defined by the “bw” variable. 
 
3.2.3 Wi-Fi Jammer 
The Wi-Fi Jammer is a program with the capacity of jamming signals that operate 
in the same frequency as the Wi-Fi. The user can choose which channel does he wish to 
jam in the 2.4GHz band and in the 5GHz band. The Wi-Fi Jammer was built with the 






Figure 13 - Wi-Fi Jammer Client Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• QT GUI Chooser ID: “wifi” – Block that allows the user to choose which Wi-Fi 
channel does he want to jam. 








The used blocks were: 
• Variables – Variables that receive the values from the client through the XMLRPC 
blocks. 
• Multiply – Block used to multiply the signal from the “Signal Source” and the 
“Low Pass Filter”. 
• Low Pass Filter – Same function as in 3.2.1.2, with a cut-off frequency of 500kHz. 
• XMLRPC Server; Noise Source; Signal Source – Same function as in 3.2.1.2. 
• Osmocom sink – Same function as in 3.2.1.2, with a variable centre frequency 
defined by the “wifi” variable. 
3.2.4 WI-FI Jammer All Band 
The Wi-Fi Jammer All Band is a program designed to jam all the 2.4GHz Wi-Fi 
band. It only requires a Server because there are no changeable parameters, as shown 
on Figure 15. 
 Server 
 
Figure 15 - Wi-Fi Jammer All Band Server Block Diagram 
The Wi-Fi Jammer All Band Server is composed by the following blocks: 
• Variable ID: “sweep_time” – Variables that defines a value for the sweep time 
on the “Function Probe” block. 




• Variables ID: “center_freq_max” and “center_freq_min” – Variables created to 
indicate the amplitude of the signal to be probed. 
• Signal Source and Probe Signal Vector – The first block creates a cosine wave that 
is then probed by the Probe Signal Vector block.  
• Function Probe – Receives the vector from the “Probe Signal Vector” block and 
creates a function with that data. 
• Signal Source and Osmocom Sink – Receive the signal from the “Function Probe” 
block and transmits it to the HackRF.  
3.2.5 GNSS Jammer 
The GNSS Jammer is a program designed to jam three GNSSs: GPS, GLONASS and 
GALILEU. The GNSS Jammer has the block diagrams shown in Figures 16 and 17: 
 Client 
 
Figure 16 - GNSS Jammer Client Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• Variable ID: “gps_freql1”, “gps_freql2”, “glonass” and “galileu” – Variables that 




• QT GUI Chooser ID: “gnss” – Block that generates buttons that allow the user to 
choose which GNSS does he wish to jam. 
• QT GUI Chooser ID: “n” – Block that creates a list of possible GLONASS channels 
to jam ( -7 to 6). 




Figure 17 - GNSS Jammer Server Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• Variables – Variables that receive the values from the client through the XMLRPC 
blocks. 
• Multiply – Block used to multiply the signal from the “Signal Source” and the 
“Low Pass Filter”. 
• XMLRPC Server; Noise Source; Signal Source; Low Pass Filter – Same function as 
in 3.2.1.2. 
• Osmocom sink – Same function as in 3.2.1.2 with a variable centre frequency 




3.2.6 AIS Spoofer 
The AIS Spoofer is a program that has the capacity of creating AIS contacts. The 
AIS sentences on the server were built with the codes provided in [44] for AIVDM/AIVDO 
protocol decoding and by the US Coast Guard on [45] and the AIS Frame Builder Block 
used was created by Marco Balduzzi [46]. The AIS Spoofer has the following block 




Figure 18 - AIS Spoofer Client Block Diagram 
The used blocks were: 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “mmsi” – Block that receives the MMSI. 
• WX GUI Chooser ID: “NAVSTAT” – Block that receives the navigational status and 
converts it into a number for the construction of the final message. The available 
navigational statuses are:  




o At anchor;  
o Not Under command;  
o Restricted manoeuvrability; 
o Moored; 
o Aground;  
o Engaged in fishing;  
o Under way sailing;  
o Not defined. 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “SOG” – Receives the speed over ground value in knots. 
• WX GUI Chooser ID: “tipe” – Receives the type of ship and converts it into a 
number. The available types of ships are:  
o Not Available; 
o Wing in ground; 
o Fishing; 
o Towing; 
o Dredging or underwater ops; 
o Diving ops; 
o Military ops; 
o Sailing; 
o Pleasure Craft; 
o Pilot Vessel; 
o Search and Rescue vessel; 
o Tug; 
o Law Enforcement;  
o Medical Transport; 
o Non-combatant ship according to RR Resolution No. 18; 
o Passenger;  
o Cargo;  
o Tanker; 
o Other Type. 




• WX GUI Text Box ID: “width” – Receives the width of the ship value in meters. 
• WX GUI Notebook ID: “notebook” – Creates an interface to accommodate all the 
text boxes and choosers. 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “Long” – Receives the longitude value for the position of the 
ship 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “Lat” – Receives the latitude value for the position of the 
ship 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “COG” – Receives the course over ground value in degrees. 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “cs” – Receives the callsign of the ship. 
• WX GUI Text Box ID: “name” – Receives the name of the ship. 
• WX GUI Chooser ID: “channel_select” – Allows the user to choose the AIS channel 
and which message does he wants to send. The available options are: Dynamic - 
CHA, Dynamic - CHB, Dynamic - Both, Static – A and Static – B. 







Figure 19 - AIS Spoofer Server Block Diagram 
 
The used blocks were: 
• Variables ID: “mmsi”, “NAVSTAT”, “SOG”, “Long”, “Lat”, “COG”, “name”, “cs”, 
“channel_select”, “tipe”, “length” and “width” –Variables that receive the values 
from the client through the XMLRPC Server block. 
• Variable ID: “Dynamic” – Builds the Dynamic AIS message (type 1), making it 
ready to introduce in the AIS Frame Builder. The message is built according to 
Table 9: 
Table 9 - AIS Dynamic Message Sentence 
Nº Bits Description Message Part 




2 Repeat Indicator 00 






8 Rate of Turn 10000000 











12 COG "{0:b}".format(COG).rjust(12,'0') 
9 True Heading 111111111 





3 Spare 000 
1 RAIM Flag 1 
19 Radio Status 0010100000111110011 
 
• Variable ID: “Part A” - Builds the Static AIS message (type 24), making it ready to 
introduce in the AIS Frame Builder. The type 24 AIS message is divided in two 
parts: A and B. The part A message is built according to Table 10: 
 
Table 10 - AIS Static Part A Message Sentence 
Nº Bits Description Message Part 
6 Message Type 011000 




30 MMSI "{0:b}".format(mmsi).rjust(30,'0') 
2 Part Number 00 
120 Vessel Name namebin+('0'*(156-6-2-30-2-len(name))) 
 
• Variable ID: “Part B” – Part B of the static type 24 AIS Message. The part B 
message is built according to Table 11. The dimensions present on the static type 
24 AIS message are the distances from the AIS antenna. Here, it’s considered that 
the antenna is in the middle of the ship. 
Table 11 - AIS Static Part B Message Sentence 
Nº Bits Description Message Part 
6 Message Type 011000 
2 Repeat Indicator 00 
30 MMSI "{0:b}".format(mmsi).rjust(30,'0') 
2 Part Number 01 
8 Ship Type '{0:b}'.format(tipe).rjust(8,'0') 
18 Vendor ID 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 
42 Callsign csbin (Variable) 
9 Dimension to Bow '{0:b}'.format(lenght/2).rjust(9,'0') 
9 Dimension to Stern '{0:b}'.format(lenght/2).rjust(9,'0') 





6 Spare 000000 
 
• Variable ID: “Vocabolary” – List of 6-bit ASCII characters used in AIS sentences. 
• Variable ID: “nametest” – Creates a 20-character sentence containing the name 
of the ship and, if the name isn’t 20 characters long, it replaces the empty spaces 




vocabulary (000000). That’s why it’s the character replacing empty spaces. The 
code used is: name+"@"*(19-len(name)). 
• Variable ID: “letter(number)” – Variable that reads the character on the 
“nametest” variable. There is one “letter” variable for each character. The code 
used is: nametest[number]. 
• Variable ID: “namebin” – It replaces each character in the “letter” variables for 
its 6-bit ASCII code equivalent. The code used is: 
'{0:b}'.format(vocabolary.find(letter0)).rjust(6, '0')  + 
'{0:b}'.format(vocabolary.find(letter1)).rjust(6, '0') + … 
• Variable ID: “cslenght” – Same as the “nametest” variable but applied to the 
callsign. 
• Variable ID: “csbin” – Same as the “namebin” variable but applied to the callsign. 
• Variable ID: “amp” – Variable used to define the amplitude of the signals. 
• AIS Frame Builder – Block that transforms the sentences from the Dynamic, Part 
A and Part B variables into an AIS Frame. 
• GMSK Mod – Block that modulates the AIS Frame using Gaussian Minimum Shift 
Key modulation. 
• Selector – Selects what signal to send to the “osmocom Sink” block. 
• Signal Source, osmocom Sink, Multiply and Add – Same function as in 3.2.1.2 and 
3.2.2.2. 
3.2.7 Remote Control 
To implement the EW package and running the programs in an autonomous 
vehicle, it was necessary to create a way of controlling them remotely. In order to do 
that, two external programs had to be created. These programs (programmed in 
Python), the “Client” and the “Server” are in Appendix A and B, with the explained script 
and steps.  
The “Client” is the program that runs on the GCS and is responsible for sending 
the messages and commands to the UxS and to open the interface programs on the GCS. 
It allows the user to input the IP address and port for communicating with the UxS. After 




to initiate, being the available programs the AIS Jammer, the AIS Spoofer, the Free 
Jammer, the GNSS Jammer, the WiFi Jammer and the WiFi Jammer All Band. 
The “Server” is the program that runs in the UxS and it deals with the commands 
received from the “Client” and starts the previously mentioned programs on the 
Raspberry Pi. Also, the “Server” sends messages to the GCS to provide confirmation and 
status information to the user. 



































































4 Experiments and Results 
In order to prove the effectiveness and the applicability of the Jammer, some tests 
were made. In this chapter, those tests are presented. 
4.1 Portuguese Naval Academy Test 
On the 14th of January 2019, a test was made at the Portuguese Naval Academy. 
The objective was to test if the WiFi Jammer was effective against an UAV commercial 
off the shelf (COTS). The UAV used for this test was a “Parrot Bebop 2” which is 
controlled via an app on a mobile phone along with the “Parrot Skycontroller 2” for 
increased range with a transmission power of 24dBm and an antenna gain of 5dBi. The 
UAV’s control signal and video link frequency are in the 2.4 GHz band. Specifically, for 
this test, WiFi channel 11 (2.462 GHz) was chosen in order to reduce the interference to 
other working networks, after an analysis has been made to the surrounding 
environment.  
On the Jammer side, the used program was the WiFi Jammer, running on a laptop 
along with the HackRF, a 1W WiFi signal amplifier and a 7dBi WiFi antenna. Once the 
used antenna was omnidirectional, a home-made reflector was made in order to 
increase its directivity. With a spectrum analyser, a test was made in order to detect the 
power that the WiFi amplifier was really emmiting. The registered value 42dbm above 
the noise level. The power amplifier was 1 meter away from the antenna of the spectrum 
analyser. In Figure 22, a screenshot of the spectrum analyser is shown: 
 





According to the Wireless-Nets [47], the minimum signal to noise ratio (SNR) for a 
wireless communication to be able to be established and to be stable is 10 dB. With this, 
in order to jam the signal between the remote controller and the UAV if they’re 1 meter 
apart (SNR=53dB) [48], the jammer to signal ratio must be approximately -43dB. So, in 













                                                              (1) 
Simplifying and converting to dB: 
𝐽
𝑆
= 𝑃𝐽 + 𝐺𝐽 − 𝑃𝑇 − 𝐺𝑇 + 20 log 𝑑𝑆 − 20 log 𝑑𝐽                  (2) 
Being: 
• J the jammer signal power at intended receiver (dB) 
• S the transmitter signal power at intended receiver (dB) 
• PJ the jammer signal output power (dBW) 
• PT the transmitter output power (dBW) 
• GJ the jammer antenna gain (dBi) 
• GT the transmitter antenna gain (dBi) 
• dJ the distance from the jammer to the receiver (m) 
• dS the distance from the transmitter to the receiver (m) 





20                                           (3) 
After substituting the values, the obtained theoretical value for the maximum 
range of the jammer was 376 meters. 





Figure 23 - Jammer set on the Naval Academy’s Test 
To do the test, the UAV and controller were both with the operator within a 
maximum distance of 1 meter. After turning on the Jammer, the operator started to 
move away from the jammer in a straight line. The stopping point for the operator would 
be either when the Jammer stopped being effective or when he reached the limit of the 
Academy’s perimeter.  
Figure 24 shows the points where the Jammer was and the point where the UAV 





Figure 24 - Naval Academy's Jamming Test 
The Jammer was effective until the operator reached the Academy’s perimeter, 
totalling an effective distance of 300 meters, with a free-space pathloss of 89.20dB, as 
described in the following equation, being d the distance in kilometres and f the 
frequency in MHz: 
𝐹𝑆𝑃𝐿(𝑑𝐵) = 32.5 + 20 log 𝑑 + 20 log 𝑓                                 (2) 
 Between the jammer and the UAS operator there were some obstacles, such as 
cars, trees and fences.  
4.2 Portuguese Marines Base Test 
Another test has been made during an EW exercise against UAVs COTS in the 17th 
of January 2019. This time, the test was done at the Portuguese Marines Base in the 
Lisbon Naval Base. The purpose of this exercise was to test the available capacities of 
the Portuguese Marines EW Unit against UAVs, using several techniques and equipment 





 To test the Wi-Fi Jammer, all the parameters of the exercise were similar to the 
ones in the Naval Academy’s Test. Figures 25 and 26 show the set of the Jammer and 
the points where the operator and the Jammer were, respectively: 
 
Figure 25 - Portuguese Marines container and Parrot Bepop 2 
 
Figure 26 - Portuguese Marines Base Jamming Test 
In this case, the jamming was also effective in the measured distance of 330 meters with 




4.3 Lisbon Naval Base Test 
On the 12th of February 2019, a test was made at the Lisbon Naval Base in order 
to determine how effective were the Portuguese Navy’s defences against UAS COTS and 
to determine if the Wi-Fi Jammer was effective against these threats on a more realistic 
scenario. The exercise’s report in presented on Appendix C. 
The exercise was composed by a series of approaches with UAS COTS to two ships 
(NRP António Enes and NRP Vasco da Gama) in order to verify the crew’s procedures to 
the presence of unauthorized UAS flying on the Naval Base perimeter. To do this, several 
approaches were made at different altitudes and speeds with two types of UAVs: a fixed-
wing and a rotary-wing. After this, a jamming test was made to test the performance of 
this defensive measure against an UAS approaching at its maximum velocity. 
The flight plan of the fixed-wing UAV during the exercise is presented on Figure 27:  
 
Figure 27 - Naval Base Test Fixed-Wing UAV Flight Plan 
The overall results of the test regarding the use of the Wi-Fi Jammer were good. The 
jammer was capable of making the UAV to stop on a stationary flight, heavily reducing 




4.4 NRP Álvares Cabral Test 
On the 3rd of February 2019, a test was made on board the Portuguese Navy ship 
NRP Álvares Cabral docked at the Lisbon Naval Base, in order to evaluate if the AIS 
Spoofer could create fake contacts on an actual AIS Transponder.  
Because there were other ships in the area, the output power used on the AIS Spoofer 
was kept to its minimum to not interfere with other operations in the Base. To ensure 
that the AIS antenna of the ship received the emitted signal, the EW Package was placed 
within a few meters of the antenna. 
 The tested modes were the “Dynamic – Both”, “Static – A” and “Static – B”. For 
the “Dynamic – Both” mode the configuration was the following: 
• MMSI: 235222222; 
• SOG: 20 KTS; 
• Navigation Status: Under way using engine; 
• Longitude: -9.5963444; 
• Latitude: 38.5298187; 
• COG: 270. 
These parameters were set to the AIS Spoofer as shown in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28 - "Dynamic - Both" Test 
For the “Static – A” and “Static – B” mode tests, the configuration was the following: 
• Width: 5 m; 




• Name: TEST; 
• Length: 40 m; 
• Callsign: DDDD 
These parameters were set to the AIS Spoofer as shown in Figure 29: 
 
Figure 29 – “Static – A” and “Static – B” Test 
The NRP Álvares Cabral’s AIS transponder was able to receive a valid AIS message on 






All the tests that were made, proved to be successful. Even though only the Wi-Fi 
Jammer had medium range tests, all the other jammers were tested on a spectrum 
analyzer with lower output power values, matching the expected results. 
The proposed hypothesis to the research question: “By using an SDR transceiver 
and a Raspberry Pi computer, it is possible to build a device with jamming and spoofing 
capabilities on various communication systems, capable of being implemented on an 
UxS.”, has been proved.  
The jamming and spoofing capabilities mentioned above, constituted by an AIS 
Jammer, a Free Jammer, a Wi-Fi Jammer, a Wi-Fi Jammer in all band, a GNSS Jammer 
and an AIS Spoofer have been achieved using the proposed components (an SDR and 
the Raspberry Pi computer). The HackRF One as the chosen SDR had a good performance 
running the programs being its biggest limitation the 20MHz available bandwidth which, 
in the Wi-Fi jammer All Band, lead to the need of further development on the program, 
in order to jam all the Wi-Fi band (approximately 100MHz). The Raspberry Pi also dealt 
well with the programs however, the small size of this computer comes with a prize: the 
processing capacity is smaller than a normal size computer. This reduced processing 
capacity lead to several necessary adjustments to the programs such as the enlargement 
of the transition width of the low-pass filters resulting in a smaller efficiency on the 
transmitted power and the limitation on the sample rate resulting in emitted signals 
with lower bandwidths. But, even with these limitations on the components, the overall 
result proves that the hypothesis to the research question is possible. 
The importance of improving EW capacities was why this EW package was 
developed. This importance is stated by NATO, which recognizes its “limited capability 
for EA”, considering that this capability “is expected to grow as operational lessons have 
identified the need” [14].  Controlling the EM spectrum has a high impact on the success 
of military operations, especially if the units are highly dependent on wireless 
communication systems such as the ones developed in this EW package. Being able to 




importance. Also, embarking jammers on autonomous vehicles has a high potential 
because one of the major problems with jamming is that, when transmitting, the 
jamming unit/source reveals its position, potentializing situations of grave danger. By 
separating the jammer from the operators, this danger is heavily reduced. 
5.1 Future Work 
The propositions for future work, based on the developed work in this thesis, are the 
development of a detector for irregular EM emissions on frequencies of strategic 
interest, using an SDR and GNU Radio, in order to improve ES capabilities and to 
complement the use of the EW package developed in this thesis. 
Also, the development of new programs, adding capacities and expanding EA 
capabilities to new communication systems would bring benefits for the final user of the 
EW package 
Finally, the development of another communications’ protocol between the 
embarked EW package and the GCS, possibly considering frequency hopping or encoded 
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7 Appendixes  










from subprocess import check_output 
import time  #Dependecies import 
 
def main(): 
 host=raw_input("IP: ") #Input for the IP 
 port=raw_input("PORT: ") #Input for the Port 
 port=int(port) 
 addr = (host, port) 
 UDPSock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM) #Creation of the UDP socket 
 
 print "LIST OF AVAILABLE PROGRAMS: \n TEST \n AIS JAMMER \n AIS SPOOFER \n 
FREE JAMMER \n GNSS JAMMER \n WIFI JAMMER \n WIFI JAMMER ALL BAND \n PEAK FINDER 
\n  EXIT \n" #List of available programs 
#Program Choosing 
   
 
 inp=raw_input("Choose Program: ") 
 
 if (inp == "TEST") or (inp == "Test") or (inp == "test"): #Test Program 
 
  subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/Test/top_block.py"])  
 
  time.sleep(1) 
 
  def test(): 
 
   try: 
    s = xmlrpclib.Server('http://localhost:8080') 
   except socket.error: 
    print 'Failed to create socket' 
    sys.exit() 
 
   while(1) : 
    msg = raw_input('Enter message to send :') 
    msg=int(msg) 
    try : 
     #Set the whole string 
     s.set_freq(msg)     
    
    except socket.error, msg: 
     print 'Error Code : ' + str(msg[0]) + ' Message 
' + msg[1] 
     #sys.exit() 





  test() 
 #AIS SPOOFER 
 elif (inp == "ais spoofer") or (inp == "AIS SPOOFER") or (inp == "Ais 
Spoofer"): #Possible inputs to open AIS Spoofer 
   
 
 #p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/AIS_SPOOFER/top_block.py"])  
 
 pp=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/AIS_SPOOFER/client.py"])
 #Opens the client program 
  data='aisspoofer' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) #Sends the word on the variable data to 
the Server in order to open the AIS Spoofer on the Raspberry Pi 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Spoofing? [Y] : ') 
 #Part of the cicle dedicated to close the program 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   #p.kill() 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   pp.kill() 
 
 
 # AIS JAMMER 




 #p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/AIS_JAMMER/top_block.py"])  
 
 pp=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/AIS_JAMMER/client.py"]) 
  data='aisjammer' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Jamming? [Y] : ') 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   #p.kill() 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   pp.kill() 
   main() 
 
 # FREE JAMMER 




 #p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/FREE_JAMMER/top_block.py"])  
 
 pp=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/FREE_JAMMER/client.py"]) 
  data='freejammer' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Jamming? [Y] : ') 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   #p.kill() 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   pp.kill() 
   main() 
  
  # GNSS JAMMER 










  data='gnssjammer' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Jamming? [Y] : ') 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   #p.kill() 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   pp.kill() 
   main() 
 
  # WIFI JAMMER 
 elif (inp == "WIFI JAMMER") or (inp == "Wifi Jammer") or (inp == "wifi 
jammer"): 
 
 #p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/WIFI_JAMMER/top_block.py"])  
 
 pp=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/WIFI_JAMMER/client.py"]) 
  data='wifijammer' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Jamming? [Y] : ') 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   #p.kill() 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   pp.kill() 
   main() 
 
 # WIFI JAMMER ALL BAND 
 elif (inp == "wifi jammer all band") or (inp == "WIFI JAMMER ALL BAND") or 
(inp == "Wifi Jammer All Band"): 
   
  data='wifijammerallband' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Jamming? [Y] : ') 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   main() 
 
 # PEAK FINDER - This program is designed to find peaks on the EM spectrum 
but it isn't contemplated on this work 
 elif (inp == "PEAK FINDER") or (inp == "Peak Finder") or (inp == "peak 
finder"):  
 
 #p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/PEAK_FINDER/top_block.py"])  
 
 pp=subprocess.Popen(["/home/diogo/Desktop/GNU/PEAK_FINDER/client.py"])  
  data='peakfinder' 
  UDPSock.sendto(data, addr) 
  close=raw_input('Do you wish to stop Jamming? [Y] : ') 
  if (close=='Y') or (close=='y'): 
   #p.kill() 
   UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) 
   pp.kill() 
   main()  
 
 # EXIT  
 elif (inp == "EXIT") or (inp == "Exit") or (inp == "exit"):   
  UDPSock.sendto("exitt", addr) #Closes the program on the 
Raspberry Pi 
  sys.exit() 






  print ("\n \n NOT AVAILABLE \n \n") #If there is a typing 
error, the program returns to the initial question 
  time.sleep(1) 








7.2  Appendix B - Server 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
import os  
from socket import * 
import subprocess   #Dependencies import 
host = ""  #Host that listens in any IP 
port = 12345  #Port 12345 
buf = 1024  #Buffer size: 1024 
addr = (host, port)  #Creation of an address containing the Host and the Port 
UDPSock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)  #Creation of the UDP Socket  
UDPSock.bind(addr)     #Definition of the UDP Socket's 
address 
print "Waiting to receive messages..."  #Message viewed by the User 
while True:      #Cycle to keep the program 
running 
 (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) #Makes the program listen to 
incoming messages on the address 
 print "Received message: " + data  #Prints the data received  
 if data == "aisspoofer":    #AIS SPOOFER 
 p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/pi/Desktop/GNU/AIS_SPOOFER/top_block.py"]) 
#Opens the AIS SPOOFER program 
  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt":      
   p.kill() #Closes the program if received data is "exitt" 
   print "Received message: " + data 
 if data == "aisjammer": #AIS JAMMER 
 p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/pi/Desktop/GNU/AIS_JAMMER/top_block.py"]) 
  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt": 
   p.kill() 
                        print "Received message: " + data 
 if data == "freejammer": #FREE JAMMER 
 p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/pi/Desktop/GNU/FREE_JAMMER/top_block.py"]) 
  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt": 
   p.kill() 
                        print "Received message: " + data   





  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt": 
   p.kill() 
                        print "Received message: " + data   
 if data == "wifijammer": #WIFI JAMMER 
 p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/pi/Desktop/GNU/WIFI_JAMMER/top_block.py"]) 
  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt": 
   p.kill() 
                        print "Received message: " + data   
if data == "wifijammerallband": #WIFI JAMMER ALL BAND 
p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/pi/Desktop/GNU/WIFI_JAMMER_ALLBAND/top_block.py"]) 
  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt": 
   p.kill() 
                        print "Received message: " + data                         
 if data == "peakfinder": #PEAK FINDER 
 p=subprocess.Popen(["/home/pi/Desktop/GNU/PEAK_FINDER/top_block.py"]) 
  (data, addr) = UDPSock.recvfrom(buf) 
  if data == "exitt": 
   p.kill() 
   print "Received message: " + data  
 if data == "exit":  #Shutdown of the program 







7.3 Appendix C – Lisbon Naval Base Test Report 
 
 
LISBON NAVAL BASE EXERCISE REPORT 
DATE: 12/02/2019 PLACE: Lisbon Naval Base PERIOD: 1430 - 1540 
NAVAL UNITS: 
 -NRP VGAM; 
 -NRP CORENES; 
UAV COTS: 
 -PARROT DISCO FPV (UAV1); 
 -PARROT BEBOP 2 FPV (UAV2); 
 
METEOROLOGY: 
 -Clear skies; 
 -Wind 4 knots; 
 
1442 – Beginning of the Exercise; UAV1 take-off. 
1443 – UAV1 sighted by the Observing Team aboard NRP VGAM; Duty Officer of NRP Bérrio contacts 
Lisbon Naval Base’s Duty Officer reporting that two ASPOF are conducting an exercise with UAVs 
on pier 8. 
1444 – UAV1 initiates 120m approach. 
1445 – UAV1 sighted by NRP VGAM’s Duty Officer. 
1446 – Attempt (Failed) of NRP VGAM’s Duty Officer to report UAV1 sighting to the COMNAV (by radio 
and telephone). 
1447 – UAV1 begins 100m approach; NRP VGAM’s Duty Officer contacts Lisbon Naval Base’s Duty 
Officer (by telephone) and reports the sighting of UAV1. Patrol sailor loses sight of UAV1. 
1449 – UAV1 begins 80m approach. 
1451 – UAV1 does a 2nd 80m approach; NRP CORENES’ Duty Officer sights UAV1 and reports it to the 
Naval Base Duty Officer; No other measures are taken. 
1453 – UAV1 initiates 60m approach. 
1454 – UAV1 is sighted by NRP VGAM’s patrol sailor. 
1455 – UAV1 initiates 40m approach; NRP CORENES’ crew sights UAV1 but doesn’t report it. 
1456 – UAV1’s operator loses control signal. 
1458 – UAV1’s operator recovers control signal. 
1500 – UAV1 begins 20m approach. 
1501 – NRP CORENES’ crew sights UAV1 but doesn’t report it. 
1503 – UAV1 starts landing procedures. 
1507 – UAV1 lands. 
1517 – UAV2 take-off. 
1518 – UAV2 is detected by NRP CORENES but there’s no alarm. 
1518 – UAV2 is detected by the Observing Team aboard NRP VGAM. 
1521 – UAV2 lands to verify altimeter. 
1522 – UAV2 take-off. 
1528 – 1st high-speed approach with UAV2 to NRP VGAM; UAV2 loses signal due to Jamming defence 
measures and stays stationary. 
1531 – 2nd high-speed approach with UAV2 to NRP VGAM; UAV2 loses signal due to Jamming defence 
measures and stays stationary. 
1532 – UAV2 is sighted by NRP CORENES’ Duty Officer. 
1535 – End of exercise. 
 
• Remarks:  
a) Although the visibility conditions were excellent, the UAVs were hard to detect and track, even at 20m; 
b) Apart from NRP Bérrio (whose Duty Officer sighted the UAV’s operators at the beginning of the exercise) 
and the two ships participating on the exercise, no other ships reported the sighting of the UAVs. The two 
possible explanations for this may be: either the UAVs were not sighted, or they were sighted but not reported 
to the Naval Base’s Duty Officer. 
c) Apart from the communication between the Duty Officers, no other measures have been taken on board. 
After reporting the UAVs, no tracking was made in order to keep visual contact. 
 
